Abstract: We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over environmental standards and taxes, the developing country may have a 'secondmover advantage.' In our model, …rms do not unanimously prefer lower environmentalstandard levels. We introduce this feature to an otherwise familiar model of …scal competition. Three distinct outcomes can be characterized by varying the cost to …rms of 'standard mismatch': (1) the outcome may be e¢ cient; (2) the developing country may be a 'pollution haven,'where some …rms escape excessively high environmental standards in the developed country; (3) environmental standards may be set excessively high.
Introduction
The recent integration of countries in Eastern Europe to the European Union (EU) has provoked renewed concern about the aggressive competition by new members for …rms and other mobile factors. For example, although EU accession requirements demand moves towards harmonization of environmental standards and some measures have made it onto statute books, there appears to be widespread skepticism about the actual implementation of such measures. Citing the incentive not to raise standards in order to attract …rms, Post (2002) states that 'there is a "deception gap" between what is said on paper and what is done in practice' with regard to environmental policy. 5 To investigate this concern, our paper develops a model of international competition over environmental standards (ESs) and taxes. Firms who locate in a country are required to pay a tax that is used, at least in part, to enforce the ES in that country. The main purpose of this paper is to show that, through competition in ESs and taxes, a developing/transition country may indeed have a 'second-mover advantage'over a developed country in attracting …rms and extracting rents.
While this concern has circulated in policy discussions for some time now, to our knowledge it has not been studied formally before in the literature on …scal competition.
This issue has been raised particularly with respect to the more economically successful 'transition countries'from the former Soviet Union as well as, to a lesser extent, the 'emerging market'developing countries in Asia and the Middle East. The so-called 'Visegrad countries' of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (V4 for short) exemplify the developing and transition countries that we have in mind. These countries are in the midsts of comprehensive governmental reforms, and arguably their governments have a greater degree of ‡exibility and fewer constitutional and institutional constraints than the long-established democracies in the core of Europe. A greater degree of ‡exibility in policy-making has also been observed in dictatorships and young democracies further a…eld. For brevity, throughout the paper we will use 'developing country' as a catch-all term for all such countries. 6 We capture this greater ‡exibility in policy-making by the developing country, as a result of which it can respond (say within the period of a parliament) to policies adopted by the developed country, through our speci…cation of timing in the game of policy formation. In our two country model, we will assume that the developed country sets its standard and tax …rst, followed by the developing country.
In contrast to the past literature (summarized below), we focus on a situation where the tax base is not universally repelled by, nor universally attracted to, ESs. Consider the familiar textbook example where an upstream …rm pollutes a river, harming the pro…ts of a …sherman
downstream. An ES that requires the …rm to reduce its pollution will improve the pro…ts of the …sherman while reducing the pro…ts of the …rm. We extend this example to consider a general setting where one group of …rms exerts a negative environmental externality on another group, and where the negative e¤ect can be moderated through an ES. Formally, the set of …rms can be ranked according to how the ES a¤ects their pro…tability, where the e¤ect on a particular …rm can be positive or negative depending on the level of the standard.
Thus each …rm has an ideal ES level and this ideal level varies across …rms. We introduce this feature to an otherwise familiar model of …scal competition. It is this feature of the model that gives rise to the second-mover advantage in policy-setting that we identify. 7 As the discussion so far suggests, we model competition for mobile …rms as a sequential game between governments who choose standards and taxes. Due to monitoring costs, the higher the standard set by a country the more costly it is to implement. Following a common hypothesis in the literature (due to Niskanen 1977), national governments are run by bureaucrats who seek to maximize their budgets (tax revenue minus the cost of implementing the standard). There is a continuum of …rms (while consumers are not explicitly considered). 7 Broadly, the prior literature on interjurisdictional competition over ESs and taxes can be categorized into two areas. The …rst area, following Tiebout (1956) , focuses on situations where competition among independent governments is like competition among …rms and enhances e¢ ciency. Here the 'Tiebout assumption' is that all …rms bene…t to di¤ering degrees from a clean environment and sort themselves e¢ ciently into jurisdictions each of which enforces an ES that is appropriate for its members. The second area concerns the presence of a policy-failure that allows or induces governments to set taxes on mobile capital, as in the literature on …scal federalism and 'standard tax competition'associated with Oates (1972) , Wilson (1986) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) . Capital is indi¤erent to the imposition of an ES, but is repelled if burdened with having to pay for the ES. In these situations local jurisdictions, while competing for mobile capital, at the same time tax that capital to protect the environment. In this literature, the terms 'environmental standard'and 'environmental regulation'are used interchangeably. See Wilson (1996) and Levinson (2003) for surveys. Our model combines features of models from both areas: on the one hand competition between governments introduces e¢ ciency enhancing incentives; on the other hand the broader environment in which these incentives operate is one of policy-failures that preclude the attainment of a fully e¢ cient equilibrium.
We refer to the di¤erence between a …rm's ideal standard level and the level actually set in a country as the 'standard mismatch' for that …rm. A key parameter in the model is the 'marginal cost of standard mismatch' (mcsm) which parameterizes how a given standard mismatch a¤ects a …rm's costs of production. Each …rm (being small and behaving nonstrategically) chooses its location to maximize pro…ts, taking as given the tax levels and its standard mismatches in the two countries.
Our simple framework yields a surprisingly rich set of equilibrium predictions that depends on the mcsm. There are three possible sorts of outcome. haven; a place where …rms that prefer a low ES locate in order to escape the high ES set in the developed country. (3) If the cost of standard mismatch is high then both governments set their ES ine¢ ciently high and, because countries are di¤erentiated by their ES levels, the intensity of tax competition is reduced as well. It is especially interesting that ine¢ ciently high standards can arise in equilibrium, either in the developed country alone (as in 2) or in both countries (as in 3) purely through strategic interaction between governments in their competition for …rms and not as a result of attempts by governments to regulate the environment on behalf of consumers/citizens. 8 The precise set of interactions that gives rise to these equilibrium outcomes will be described in due course. 9 As mentioned above, competition between jurisdictions over standards and taxes has already received some attention in the literature. For example, Oates and Schwab (1998) consider a large number of small jurisdictions who compete in taxes and ESs to attract capital from the world capital market. Markusen, Morey and Olewiler (1995) consider a situation where two jurisdictions compete to attract the plants of a …rm. 10 The concern in 8 The issue of governments setting environmental standards too high, in order to dissuade a noxious production facility from locating in their jurisdictions, is referred to as 'not in my back yard' or NIMBY, and brings about a 'race to the top'. In our framework governments do not raise taxes to repel …rms since we do not model consumers nor other parties who may be harmed by the hosting of …rms. (NIMBY has been studied by Levinson (1999a,b) among others.) Yet we can get a similar outcome to a 'race to the top' through a quite di¤erent set of interactions. 9 Since apart from the sequencing of their policy decisions countries are ex ante symmetrical, …rm location decisions are determined solely by the interaction of policy choices with …rms' preferences over standards. In equilibrium outcomes (2) and (3), a relatively large share of …rms locates in the developing country. We take this to re ‡ect the net ‡ow of …rms and capital towards the V4 (see World Bank 1996 page 136) and countries in the emerging markets more generally. 10 Markusen et al (1995) also consider the possibility of NIMBY.
both settings is with conditions under which competition between governments will lead to a departure from an e¢ cient outcome. These papers make important contributions. Yet as far as we are aware, the situation that we examine here in which some …rms in ‡ict pollution externalities on others has not previously been studied in the context of …scal competition, nor has the focus of attention been the issue of developing country second-mover advantage.
We will continue the discussion of how the present paper relates to the literature in Section 5 below.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 solves for the e¢ cient allocation. Section 4 de…nes strategies and the subgame perfect equilibrium and then characterizes equilibrium in terms of the three cases outlined above. Section 5 places the paper's contribution to the literature and draws conclusions.
The Model
The governments of two countries, a developed country, L (for 'leader'), and a developing country, F (for 'follower'), compete over ES levels and taxes in their attempts to induce …rms to locate in their respective countries. The governments are assumed to be rent maximizers.
There is a set of …rms, each of which is able to sell a single unit of a good. The production costs of a …rm depend on the level of taxation and the level of the ES in the country where it locates. We will …rst specify the behavior of …rms, and then we will turn to governments. This is the natural sequence of exposition given that we solve for equilibrium using backwards induction.
Firms
The world price of the unit that each …rm sells is p, and each …rm pays a private per-unit production cost, c. 11 The tax levied on the …rm is L if it locates in L and F if it locates in
denote the ES levels in L and F respectively. The value s 2 [0; 1] uniquely identi…es a …rm and its ideal ES level. 12 The (environmental) standard mismatch for a …rm s is given by the di¤erence between s and the ES level actually set in the country where the …rm locates. The impact of standard mismatch on production costs 11 To increase realism, the price that each …rm receives for the good that it sells could be made to vary across …rms without a¤ecting the results. 12 We choose the interval [0; 1] to simplify the exposition. The same qualitative results may be obtained using an arbitrary interval [a; b].
is parameterized by k; we refer to k as the marginal cost of standard mismatch (mcsm). We can then express the pro…t function for …rm s as follows:
if the …rm locates in L; if the …rm locates in F:
To focus the analysis on location decisions, it will be assumed throughout that p is su¢ ciently high to ensure that all …rms make positive pro…ts. Also, p c will serve as an upper bound for the tax that a government can set. 14 A …rm s makes equal pro…ts in both countries if and only if
in which case the …rm is indi¤erent between the two countries. If there is a single indi¤erent …rm,ŝ, then it holds thatŝ lies between l L and l F . Solving forŝ in this case we obtain:
Firm s may prefer one country, say F , in terms of the tax that it sets;
ES is su¢ ciently close to s (i.e. js l L j < js l F j) then L can attract s to its country. 15 If there is more than one indi¤erent …rm, then it must hold that for any such …rm s; either
no …rms are indi¤erent then clearly all …rms locate in one country or the other. These cases are treated in the rent functions of the governments de…ned in Section 2.2.
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Three more assumptions are needed to obtain clear-cut solutions for …rm locations:
A1. Given taxes and ESs, a …rm that is indi¤erent between the two countries locates in the country where its standard mismatch is lower.
Loosely speaking, A1 captures the idea that …rms care more about the persistence of an 13 Here, each …rm's pro…t function is single-peaked over ESs. This constitutes the key di¤erence of our model from other models of …scal competition, wherein a standard or a public good more generally de…ned would have a monotonic impact on pro…ts. In Section 5, we outline the di¤erences in outcome from the previous literature generated by our alternative modeling approach. Microfoundations for single-peakedness and some motivating examples are presented in Appendix A1. 14 We assume p is set su¢ ciently high relative to c that this bound is never attained. 15 Firms'location decisions and hence the sizes of the countries, in terms of the measure of …rms in each country, are determined strictly by the interaction of policy choices with …rms' preferences. Additional features could be introduced to make the model more realistic including, for example, infrastructure and an 'attachment to home' but this would obscure the e¤ects we want to focus on. See Hindriks (1999) for an example of where attachment to home is modeled in the context of tax (versus transfer) competition. 16 See Appendix A.1 for additional details.
established ES level than the constancy of a given tax level. For k 1, any other tiebreaking rule would yield the same results that we obtain. For k > 1, any other tie-breaking rule would lead to nonexistence of equilibrium.
A2. If all …rms are indi¤erent between the two countries, then half locate in one country and half locate in the other.
Only if both countries set the same standard and the same tax are all …rms indi¤erent.
Assumption A1 is not helpful in this case. Assuming that …rms split evenly between the two countries is the most natural tie-breaking rule for this case.
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A3. If a government has multiple best responses, it chooses the best response that maximizes
Again, some tie-breaking rule is needed. We need A3 in two cases. First, for small values of k it is essential for existence of equilibrium. Second, for k = 1, …rms care equally about low taxes and a close standard match -taxes and standard mismatch are perfect substitutes for them. As a consequence, governments have a continuum of optimal strategies to choose from. Our assumption for this case ensures that the equilibrium outcome for k = 1 is the limit of the equilibrium outcome for k < 1 as k approaches 1.
The location decisions of …rms described above are illustrated in Figure 1 . Figure 1 17 A1 and A2 introduce a discontinuity in the share of …rms locating in a country. To see this, suppose that l F < l L and thatŝ = l F . In this case every …rm whose ideal standard level is belowŝ is also indi¤erent between F and L. By A1, …rms with s 2 [0;ŝ] locate in F and all other …rms locate in L. However, if L lowered its tax by an arbitrarily small amount it could attract all …rms to its country. A similar example can be constructed using A2. Admittedly, these discontinuities are not a desirable feature of our assumptions. However, some tie breaking is needed whenever a positive measure of …rms is indi¤erent and any tie-breaking rule that we chose would result in some such discontinuities. 
Governments
Rents are given by tax revenues minus the cost of ES setting. A government's cost of enforcing an ES level l 2 [0; 1] is l per …rm that is located in its country. Thus the cost of enforcing a given ES is assumed to be proportional to the level of the ES and the number of …rms over which it must be enforced. 18 Governments move sequentially. 19 Government F takes l L and L as parameters and chooses l F and F to maximize its rents. Discontinuities arise in F 's rent function at points where, given L's strategy, F 's strategy is such thatŝ = l F orŝ = l L , and additionally when l F = l L and F = L . Below is the rent function for F .
The rent function for L is symmetric:
Case 3. Case 4. Case 5. 18 We are assuming that a higher ES level is more costly due to higher costs of enforcement. Higher ESs call for more controls because …rms'incentives not to conform increase and are likely to trigger more court cases. We would not expect our results to change qualitatively if the costs of ES setting were strictly convex instead of linear. Also, if in our model all ES levels were equally costly, existence of equilibrium would become an issue. 19 If governments set ESs and taxes simultaneously, or if they …rst simultaneously set ESs and then simultaneously set taxes (both common modeling choices in the literature on …scal competition) equilibrium in pure strategies would not exist in our model, even if the cost of standard mismatch were quadratic. F setting a lower ES than L in Case 3 and a higher ES than L in Case 4. We will refer to these third and fourth cases, where …rms are shared between the two countries, as sharing I and sharing II . Finally, Case 5 arises when F chooses its strategy so that it attracts no …rms.
E¢ ciency
Within the context of our model, an allocation is e¢ cient if it maximizes the aggregate surplus realized by …rms plus the governments'rents. An allocation consists of two ES levels and an assignment of …rms to countries, denoted by (l F ; l L ;ŝ). Formally, the allocation
The integrals are the pro…ts of …rms that are allocated to the two countries. The other two terms are the rents of the two governments. The problem can be simpli…ed to
Thus the e¢ cient allocation minimizes the sum of the aggregate costs of standard mismatch and the costs of ES setting. We use superscript e to denote an e¢ cient allocation. To express dependencies on k, we write l
It is immediate that, if k < 1, the set of e¢ cient outcomes is given by l
That is, for k < 1 it is e¢ cient to set a zero ES with the share of …rms that locates in each country being indeterminate. Even for the …rm s = 1, it is more e¢ cient to incur the costs of standard mismatch, k, than to pay for a positive ES level l that would lower mismatch costs: For k > 1, solving the minimization problem above yields the e¢ cient allocation:
The e¢ cient standard levels are increasing in k. Figure 3 illustrates the e¢ cient ES levels and the allocation of …rms to countries depending on k for the case k > 1. respectively as k becomes large. To understand why our e¢ cient ES levels are lower than they would have been in a direct application of Hotelling, recall that in our model one has to take into account the costs of enforcing the ES for each …rm assigned to a country as well as the costs of standard mismatch. If our model were a direct application of Hotelling then the level of the ES would not have a¤ected its cost of enforcement. E¢ cient ES levels in our model approach the e¢ cient levels that would have arisen in a direct application of Hotelling's model as k becomes large because the cost of standard mismatch becomes large relative to the cost of enforcement. Finally, as in Hotelling's model, in our model the share of …rms between countries is equal. This e¢ cient solution will serve as a benchmark against which to compare the equilibrium outcome.
Competition over Environmental Standards and Taxes
In this section, our approach will be to …rst de…ne equilibrium and then state our main theorem in which equilibrium is characterized. After that, we will undertake a diagrammatic discussion of the properties of equilibrium. A sketch of the proof is presented in the appendix.
For a full formal derivation of equilibrium see the appendix.
As mentioned above, ES provision and tax setting are modeled as a two-stage game. The sequence of events is as follows. Government L sets its ES level and tax and then, observing L's choices, Government F sets its ES level and tax. Taking government policies as given, …rms then make location decisions to maximize pro…ts. As usual, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is a strategy pro…le with the property that the governments'strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of the game.
A strategy for Government L is a pair consisting of an ES level and a tax. A strategy is feasible if the tax is high enough to cover the cost of ES setting. 21 Formally, the set of feasible strategies is
A strategy for Government F is a mapping that assigns a pair, consisting of an ES level and a tax, to each possible strategy choice made by Government L in the …rst stage of the game. Formally, this mapping is described by f :
Let F be the set that contains all such mappings. The set of feasible strategies for Government F consists of those members of F with the property that tax revenue covers the cost of the associated ES level; that is,
We are interested in the pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game, which can be viewed as a Stackelberg game.
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De…nition 2. A pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in taxes and ES levels is a
With the structure of the model in place and equilibrium de…ned, we are now ready to state our main theorem which characterizes equilibrium. 21 Thus we make the simplifying assumption that there are no other sources of government revenue and no international capital market that governments can tap. We do not think that allowing such a possibility would change our results, since governments make positive rents in equilibrium. 22 It will be assumed throughout that mixed strategies in tax rates are not available to governments. This is generally deemed to be an acceptable assumption in the applied literature on policy setting in a perfect information environment. Theorem 1. The outcome of the subgame perfect equilibrium.
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The subgame perfect equilibrium is as follows.
, both L and F set the minimum ES level and set zero taxes. Firms split equally between the two countries; that is, (l L ; L ) = (0; 0) and
1, the di¤erentiation in ES levels between the two countries is high; L sets an ES close to the maximum level and F sets a zero ES level.
Both governments set taxes that lead to positive rents, and rents are always higher for F than for L. The majority of …rms locates in F.
, andŝ > in both countries, with L setting a higher ES than F. The ES levels do not vary with k. Both governments make positive rents, requiring …rms to pay more than twice the cost of ES provision. F sets a higher tax than L and earns higher rents. Two-thirds of the …rms locate in F, and every …rm with a strictly higher ideal ES level than set in F locates in L. Speci…cally, it holds
k > 2l L , and l F = 2 3
. Figure 4 shows the equilibrium ES and tax levels set in the two countries depending on k. The solid curves represent the ES and tax set by L and the dashed curves represent the ES and tax set by F . As the …gure shows, the subgame perfect ES and tax levels di¤er considerably across the three regions of k: In case (a) a small k leads to an e¢ cient outcome with both countries setting the minimum ES level and taxes set at the same level in both countries at L = F = 0; in case (b), for k in an intermediate range, there is almost maximum di¤erentiation in ESs, with F setting the e¢ cient ES while L sets its ES too high and sets a higher tax than F ; in case (c), for large k, there is some di¤erentiation but it is substantially smaller than for k in the intermediate range, and both countries set ine¢ ciently high ESs while F now sets a higher tax than L. 23 The theorem is restated in Appendix A.3 with formulae for all the equilibrium values shown explicitly.
The common characteristic of equilibrium across all levels of k is that F attracts at least as many …rms as L. Also, for k > 1 3 , governments are able to extract rents. This arises as a result of the monopolistic power that each government has over location within its country.
Each …rm must locate in one country or the other in order to produce, and the government of the country where it does locate is able to exploit its resultant power when setting taxes.
In addition, F , who sets a lower ES, makes more rents because it both attracts more …rms and makes more rents per …rm.
In the following we discuss in more depth the intuition behind cases (b) and (c), providing speci…c details about the features of our model that drive them. The reason that we do not discuss case (a) further is because its logic is familiar from Brennan and Buchanan (1980) . Each …rm regards it as relatively unimportant to obtain a close standard match; thus all competition occurs in taxes, which brings about an e¢ cient outcome.
Turning to case (b), with k in an intermediate range, it is a dominant strategy for F to set its ES at zero. Government L can extract some rents (because k is not 'too small'), but only by di¤erentiating itself substantially from F (because k is not 'too large'). But L can only di¤erentiate itself by setting its standard at a su¢ ciently high level, with close to maximum di¤erentiation between the two countries. 
is the corresponding maximum tax that L can set without inducing F to choose an undercutting strategy, as a result of which L would loose its entire tax base. positive rents, L must also set a tax strictly above the cost of standard setting (i.e. above the dashed line). To achieve both objectives simultaneously, L must choose a standard level at least as large asl L . For l L l L , the relatively small distance between any value of l L and the corresponding value of^ L (l L ) allows L to make only low rents compared to F which is free to maximize the trade-o¤ in tax setting between its share of …rms and the tax that it levies on each. This provides the essential intuition behind why F obtains a second-mover advantage.
In case (c), as in case (b), a sharing tax limit imposes an upper bound on the tax that L can set while still making positive rents. However, the di¤erence in case (c) is that both countries set ine¢ ciently high ES levels. 24 Because of the higher value of k, a higher standard mismatch hurts …rms' pro…ts more than a higher tax and so it is no longer a dominant strategy for F to set a zero ES level. Instead, Government F chooses an ES level close to L's ES level (but not arbitrarily close as this would negatively a¤ect F 's ability to extract rents). Government L chooses a high ES level to induce su¢ cient di¤erentiation and to leave F large sharing rents which in turn allows L to set a relatively high tax without inducing F to undercut. This incentive to 'compete up'ES's leads both governments to set them too high in equilibrium.
The sharing tax limit for case (c) is depicted in Figure 6 . The sharing tax limit is the upper envelope of the two curves in the …gure, that is^
is the tax up to which F chooses a sharing I strategy rather than an undercutting strategy and^ 2 L (l L ) is the tax up to which F chooses a sharing II strategy rather than an undercutting strategy. If L sets a su¢ ciently low ES level and a sharing tax, then F has an incentive to share with a higher ES level because this yields higher rents than sharing with a lower ES level; this holds in reverse if F sets a su¢ ciently high ES level. Inducing F to share with a lower ES level has the advantage that the decreasing cost of standard setting gives F an incentive to choose its standard not too close to l L . Moreover, as suggested by Figure 6 , if L sets a relatively high ES level this allows it greater scope to set a relatively high tax without inducing undercutting. These combined e¤ects enable L to make higher rents than if it set l L relatively low and induced F to set l F relatively high. But its rents are still lower than those of F , so case (c) exhibits developing country second-mover advantage as well.
Relation to the Literature and Conclusions
We began this paper by noting concerns in policy circles that developing countries resembling those of recent entrants to the EU may, under certain circumstances, have a second mover advantage in setting ESs and taxes. We then set out a formal framework which makes precise a set of circumstances under which such a second-mover advantage may arise. Three possible predictions were made about the outcome of …scal competition when the public good in question is an ES. The particular prediction that emerges in equilibrium depends on the mcsm. The model focuses on the interplay between governments'incentives to manipulate policy -ESs and taxes -in order to maximize rents and …rms'incentives to locate where these policies have the most favorable impact on their pro…ts. The key point is that the government of the developed country wants to avoid inducing the developing country to undercut because that implies losing the entire tax base and hence all rents. If the mcsm is low, then ESs are not important enough to …rms for governments to be able to use them strategically. In this case, the forces of tax competition envisaged by Brennan and Buchanan dominate, and the outcome is e¢ cient. If the marginal cost of standard mismatch is high enough, the developed country government successfully induces sharing by setting a su¢ ciently high ES relative to the tax. A proportion of …rms then …nd it bene…cial to locate in each country. Governments are able to use policy to make rents, and the resulting outcome is ine¢ cient in that either the developed country government or both governments set ESs too high.
We will now place the paper's contribution to the literature, starting with the literature that follows Tiebout (1956) and then moving on to consider the literature that parallels …scal federalism and standard tax competition. As in the literature that follows Tiebout, governments in our model are rent (or pro…t) maximizing but are constrained by competition.
For example, Fischel (1975) and White (1975) share with the present paper the assumption that there is variation over …rms'preferences for standards. In keeping with our model, there are no cross-border externalities. In contrast to our model, Fischel (1975) and White (1975) both assume that individual …rms can be targeted for transfers and there is 'free entry'of jurisdictions, none of which has su¢ cient market power to extract rents from …rms. 25 As a result, within such a setting, an e¢ cient outcome can be demonstrated in which …rms 'vote with their feet.' In our model …rms cannot be targeted for transfers. There is policy failure in the sense that once the policies are set they cannot be altered. And there are only two jurisdictions. It is interesting to note that none of these di¤erences in modeling approach matter for the achievement of e¢ ciency providing that the mcsm is su¢ ciently small. It is only when the mcsm becomes su¢ ciently large for governments to compete for …rms using
ESs that a divergence from e¢ ciency arises. Given the focus on e¢ cient outcomes in this …rst area of the literature and the fact that the focus tends to be on cooperative frameworks, there is limited scope in such a setting for exploring the type of second-mover advantage that is our focus in the present paper.
Let us turn now to the second area of the literature, that parallels the literature on …scal federalism and tax competition. 26 A common feature across the two areas is that jurisdictions bene…t when total tax revenue is larger, yet at the same time each jurisdiction attracts tax base by lowering taxes and/or environmental standards. In this second area of the literature, as in our model, policy makers cannot target …rms for direct transfers. In contrast to the …rst area and also in contrast to our model, owners of the mobile resource (here capital) do not care about ESs and, seeking the highest return, tend to move their capital away from a jurisdiction if required to foot the bill for an ES. Finally, in this second area of the literature governments are benevolent and use policy to maximize the welfare of their citizens, usually including consumers, which contrasts with the …rst area of the literature and with our model.
In spite of the di¤erences between the models in the second area and our model, the forces of competition between governments can operate in a similar way. This is seen most
clearly by comparing the model of Markusen et al (1995) to ours. Recall that in Markusen et al (1995) , two jurisdictions compete for the plants of a …rm using two pollution taxes, one on domestic production and one on exports. The benchmark situation is where the …rm locates all its production facilities at home. Yet providing that transport costs are high enough and plant set-up costs are low enough, the foreign government can undercut the home government, much as in our model, to get some or all production to locate in its jurisdiction.
In contrast to our model, however, the idea of 'second-mover advantage'cannot be motivated in models from this second area of the literature. The outcome tends towards a situation where both jurisdictions obtain the same level of welfare. Levinson (1997) highlights this outcome by rewriting the model of Markusen et al so that the monopoly rents are earned locally to where a plant locates. This set-up provides the clearest setting in which to see that the country that hosts the …rm at the outset has an incentive to act in the manner of a limit-pricing monopolist, 'limit-taxing'the other country, by setting taxes just low enough that the …rm is indi¤erent between locating its plants in one country or two and welfare is the same in both countries.
The e¤ect of competition between jurisdictions is similar in Davies and Ellis (2007) although the set-up is somewhat di¤erent. In their model, each …rm bene…ts from the provision of a public good by other …rms. This public good could be a reduction of polluting emissions from the production process (although Davies and Ellis'discussion is not limited to environmental externalities). The standard in their model mandates all …rms who locate in that jurisdiction to provide the public good at the e¢ cient level while a tax break transfers rents to …rms and induces them to locate there. Davies and Ellis straddle the two areas of the literature on taxes and standards in that …rms bene…t from standard provision but a policy imperfection induces competition between the two jurisdictions. These combined features are crucial in driving the result that the outcome is e¢ cient in their framework, with …rms providing the standard at the e¢ cient level and all rents being transferred to them via the competition in taxes. 27 Their symmetric model gives rise to a symmetric equilibrium, with neither government obtaining an advantage over the other.
It may be helpful to see the e¤ects that motivate our results by direct comparison to the broader literature on …scal competition. We are comparing the role of competition over taxes and public goods more conventionally de…ned against the role of competition over taxes and
ESs in an environment where …rms exert externalities on one another. The novel feature of competition in our model is that the developed country is compelled to set its standard su¢ ciently high that it does not induce the developing country to undercut, and that this e¤ect is strong enough to give the developing country a second-mover advantage. This leads at least the developed country and sometimes the developing country as well to set the standard too high. So our aim is to establish the novelty of this e¤ect through comparison to the rest of the literature that has demonstrated over-provision of the public good.
In a standard model of …scal competition, Keen and Marchand (1997) consider a setting where the composition of public good provision matters. A jurisdiction can attract capital by increasing its productivity through a shift in spending from 'public consumption goods'such as parks and art galleries to 'public investment goods'such as road and communications networks. In this setting, competition in public good provision, which raises the return to capital that locates there, works in much the same way as tax competition.
Thus, if the public good-capital complementarity is su¢ ciently strong, the equilibrium can exhibit over-provision of the public good in equilibrium. Although the setting of Keen and Marchand's discussion invites a consideration of agglomeration externalities they leave these forces aside. Focusing on the forces of competition over public goods alone, there seems no reason to suppose that one jurisdiction or another should derive an advantage from this kind of competition, and ex ante symmetrical jurisdictions give rise to ex ante symmetrical outcomes for the respective jurisdictions in this setting. 
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In our model, the presence of the ES and …rms'single-peaked pro…ts over the ES allow governments to di¤erentiate themselves from one another. As in Baldwin and Krugman, the second-moving country shares …rms only if it cannot do better by undercutting. However, for 28 Brueckner (2000) considers Tiebout/tax competition in an environment where …rms' public good requirements vary, and shows that …rms whose requirements are similar sort themselves e¢ ciently across jurisdictions. The model of the present paper shares the feature of Tiebout-tax competition that there is variation in …rms'public good requirements. Another common feature is that governments'objectives are entirely self-serving in that they are pro…t/rent maximizing but are constrained by competition. In contrast to Tiebout/tax competition where there is no policy failure, the policy-failure in our model does allow governments to have market power and this underpins the di¤erence in outcome that e¢ ciency is not achieved in equilibrium. 29 Other papers where one jurisdiction is able to limit-tax the other include Black and Hoyt (1989) and Hau ‡er and Wooton (1999). Kind, Knarvik and Schjelderup (2000) and Boadway, Cu¤ and Marceau (2004) study tax competition in the presence of scale economies. Public investment goods do not usually play a role in such models. An exception is Justman, Thisse and van Ypersele (2002), who investigate the idea that under …scal competition regions can segment the market for industrial location by o¤ering infrastructure services that are di¤erentiated by quality. They identify a …scal agglomeration property, which motivates an asymmetric equilibrium. In a related setting, Zissimos and Wooders (2007) show that if governments are able to di¤erentiate the public good that they provide then this reduces the intensity of (bene…cent) tax competition and thus reduces e¢ ciency. In these papers, if any government has an advantage in the sequence of play it is the …rst-mover. two reasons undercutting happens in a more aggressive fashion in our model. First, there is no immobile tax base in the second-moving country. Second, in our framework a marginally reduced tax su¢ ces to undercut (while in Baldwin and Krugman, to attract the mobile tax base, the second-moving country has to compensate it for its loss in agglomeration rents as the entire mobile tax base is initially located in the …rst-moving country). To induce sharing in the presence of the aggressive undercutting behavior featured in our model, the …rst-moving country has to leave most of the rents to the second-moving country.
Our model shares similarities with Bucovetsky (2005) the feature of our model that the developing countries we focus on are able to respond quickly to the policies of developed countries and hence undercut them if it is pro…table to do so.
Inevitably, the theoretical framework developed here simpli…es the situation in a number of key respects. For example, to keep the analysis manageable we have not explicitly treated consumers in our analysis and we have restricted the number of countries to just two. A promising direction for future research would be to extend our model to give consumers a more prominent role. One potential limitation to our conclusions is that the government in the developing country does not set ESs 'too low.' While it seems reasonable to argue that developed countries may set ESs too high, a concern is that developing countries actually set their ESs too low from the perspective of consumers. The introduction of consumers to the model could make it possible for ESs to be set too low in the developing country.
Another promising direction for future research would be to ask how robust our results would be to the introduction of a larger number of countries to the model. From our analysis of the present framework it is not obvious how the outcome would be changed by the introduction of more countries. One conjecture would be that the nth country to move would always have the greatest advantage, with prior countries being constrained by those that would set policy subsequently. A di¤erent conjecture about the outcome would be that only two countries could make positive rents and that the presence of more countries would be irrelevant. If the analysis of a larger number of countries turned out to be analytically intractable then it might be possible to obtain characterizations through numerical simulation.
Finally, a question that could be addressed in the future is whether incentives exist for governments to coordinate/harmonize policy within our framework. Under perfect collusion in our model, governments would simply agree that neither of them would set a positive ES level and they would set taxes at the level of pro…ts, thereby extracting all surplus. Such an outcome would be e¢ cient in our framework in the case where k 1 because in that case the e¢ cient outcome has zero ESs; for k > 1 the e¢ cient outcome does have a positive level of ES provision. However, such perfect collusion would require a strong enforcement mechanism and, in the absence of an international enforcement body, the incentives to break such an agreement might be overwhelming. This may explain why in practice proposals for collusion have tended to be weaker, entailing for example the introduction of minimum ESs.
A surprising implication of our framework is that it is not in the interest of the developed country to introduce a binding minimum ES. The reason is that the developed country bene…ts from being able to di¤erentiate itself from the developing country and putting in place a minimum ES would limit the scope for doing so. Thus our model presents a possible way of understanding situations in which minimum ES levels have been called for but none have actually emerged. The question of policy coordination/harmonization appears to raise issues that warrant further investigation in future research.
A Appendix

A.1 Single-peaked Pro…ts
The following describes a model that generates pro…ts that are single-peaked in the standard.
Suppose that every standard level l 2 [0; 1] results in two types of costs for …rms: a cost of conforming to the standard and an externality cost arising from pollution by other …rms when the standard is set at that level. More speci…cally, assume that
where s 2 [0; 1] is uniformly distributed. A …rm of 'type's incurs a cost of (1 s)l 2 from conforming to the standard l and incurs a negative externality of s(1 l) 2 when the standard level enforced is l. Note that this negative externality decreases in the standard.
For motivation, suppose that the standard in question is water quality. The government achieves a certain quality level by setting maximum pollution levels of waste water. If a …rm produces polluted waste water as part of its production process, higher levels of water quality are associated with higher costs for that …rm because the waste water has to be cleaned before being sent back to the water system. Firms with low levels of s are those …rms for which the cleaning process is particularly expensive, either because their waste water is highly polluted or because they produce large amounts of polluted water. If water of a certain quality is an input to a …rm's production process (e.g. in a food processing industry or in the water industry), higher levels of water quality are associated with lower levels of production costs. If other …rms pollute the water system, the …rm has to purify the water itself before using it. Again, the parameter s captures di¤erent requirements for clean water across …rms. The same formal reasoning applies to other environmental standards such as standards associated with noise regulation, air or soil quality.
For the cost function c(l; s), a type s …rm's cost is minimized at the standard level l = s,
i.e. its pro…ts are single-peaked in the standard with the peak at l = s. Moreover, since s is uniformly distributed over [0; 1], so are the peaks, just as we assume in the paper. If the …rm locates in a jurisdiction where the standard level deviates from l by x, the …rm's costs go up by x 2 compared to its costs at l . Notice that the cost of standard mismatch is convex while it is linear in the model we employ in the paper. We assume a linear cost for analytical tractability and believe that the convexity of the cost would not change the qualitative nature of our results.
Note that the negative externality depends on a …rm's type and is increasing in the standard level, but does not vary with the share of …rms located in the country. Thus, we assume that the cost of a …lter to clean water depends on the …rm's speci…c requirements for clean water (captured by s) and on the standard set in the country. However, once the …lter is installed it can purify water at no marginal cost and whether there are several or only one …rm upstream who pollute the water does not a¤ect the cost of cleaning the water. 30 If instead the negative externality was yb(1 l) 2 , with y being the share of …rms located in the country in question, …rms' pro…ts would still be single-peaked with peak l =
The distribution of the peaks, however, would depend on the share of …rms located in a country, which is not consistent with the model in the paper and considerably complicates the analysis. 30 We need to make the additional innocuous assumption that in each country there is an arbitrarily small fraction of immobile …rms polluting the environment so that there always exist some …rms in each country that generate negative externalities. 31 It is worth emphasizing that the negative externality could also be one that a …rm incurs more indirectly because it has to compensate its workers for negative externalities they bear. For example, a …rm that locates in a jurisdiction with poor air and water quality might have to compensate its workers to work in such an environment.
A.2 Indi¤erence Set
The following is an application of the approach taken by d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) to the present setting. Given (l L ; L ; l F ; F ), there may be more than one …rm that is just indi¤erent between the two countries. To deal with this possibility, we de…ne the indi¤erent set of …rms and denote it by I (l L ; L ; l F ; F ). If the Indi¤erent Set is not a singleton, a tie breaking rule is needed to determine where indi¤erent …rms locate. With two exceptions, the indi¤erent set I (l L ; L ; l F ; F ) will be a singleton set, i.e.,ŝ (l L ; L ; l F ; F ) is the only member of I (l L ; L ; l F ; F ). The two exceptions are as follows.
(1) Suppose that l F < l L so that F sets a lower standard than L. For s satisfying s = l F , if
. To see this, …rst note that for …rm s 2 I (l L ; L ; l F ; F ), s = l F , the extent to which the tax in F exceeds the tax in L exactly matches the cost of standard mismatch in
Compared to the costs the …rm s = l F has in F and L, respectively, a …rm s < l F has an additional cost of standard mismatch of k(l F s) in either F or L, implying that those …rms must be indi¤erent as well and that Note that it might also be the case that no …rm is indi¤erent. For example if l L = l F and F 6 = L , all …rms prefer whichever country sets the lower tax; consequently I (l L ; L ; l F ; F ) is the empty set. More generally, whenever one country undercuts the tax of the other country by more than the cost of the standard di¤erence between the two countries, the indi¤erent set will be empty.
A.3 Derivation of Theorem 1 and Proofs
A.3.1 The developing country' s best response function
This subsection provides a characterization of F 's best response, and this is followed by a characterization of L's best response in the subsection that follows. To …nd Government F 's best response to a given strategy of L, we proceed in two steps. First, we maximize F 's rents separately over the three response subsets, sharing I, sharing II, and undercutting. 
(c) Maximize rents over undercutting 32 We can ignore Case 1 since setting the same standard level and tax as L is never a best response for F except if (l L ; L ) = (0; 0) and k 1, which is treated below. We can also ignore Case 5 since choosing a response that does not attract any …rm is never a best response for F . notational ease, we will use (l F ; F ) to denote the response that maximizes r
There are two issues that can arise when solving for the developing country's best response to (l L ; L ): First, a best response might not exist; second, a best response might not be unique. The existence of a best response to (l L ; L ) is not guaranteed because an optimal undercutting strategy does not exist. The reason is that the rent function does not have a well-de…ned maximum on the set of undercutting strategies. That is, for each undercutting strategy with F = L k jl L l F j " where " > 0, we can …nd a slightly higher tax (i.e., a smaller ") that still undercuts L's strategy. Because such a tax would yield higher rents, the optimal undercutting strategy is not well de…ned.
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In our model this di¢ culty can be resolved in a straightforward way. Since L, whenever possible, avoids strategies that induce F to undercut (i.e., undercutting happens only o¤ the equilibrium path), we can solve our model without determining the undercutting strategy.
To see that, let r s F (l L ; L ) be F 's rent from an optimal sharing strategy, and, given
Thus, if L's tax is higher than the sharing tax limit, then F can …nd an " su¢ ciently small to make undercutting rents higher than the rents earned by sharing. If L sets its tax no higher than the sharing tax limit, sharing yields higher rents for F than undercutting, no matter how small is ". We assume that F undercuts (by some ") whenever L >^ L (l L ) and shares otherwise.
To deal with the case of F having multiple best responses, recall that by A3 a government with multiple best responses chooses the best response that maximizes its share of …rms and if in addition (l L ; L ) = (0; 0), then F sets F = 0. We invoke this assumption in only two 33 The literature on entry deterrence through pricing strategy has also had to broach the issue of what constitutes a best response when payo¤ functions de…ned by the game are discontinuous and might not have a well de…ned maximum. This issue carries over to the present setting. ), Government F 's best response to any of Government L's feasible strategies is to set zero standard, and to set an undercutting tax if L > 0 and to set
If the marginal cost of standard mismatch is at an intermediate level (
there exists, for each standard level set by L, a corresponding sharing tax limit. If L sets its tax above (equal to or below) the sharing tax limit, then Government F 's best response is to set no standard and to set the corresponding optimal undercutting tax (optimal sharing tax). Speci…cally, for each l L there exists a sharing tax limit,
c. If the marginal cost of standard mismatch is high (k > 1) there exists, for each standard level set by L, a corresponding sharing tax limit. If L sets its tax above (equal to or below) the sharing tax limit, then Government F 's best response is to set the optimal undercutting tax while setting the same standard level as L (set the optimal sharing tax and set either a lower or higher standard than L): Speci…cally, for
If the marginal cost of standard mismatch is low or at an intermediate level (k 1), it does not pay for Government F to compete in the standard at all. Thus l F = 0 in parts (a) and (b). However, if the marginal cost of standard mismatch is high (k > 1), F has an 34 Note that any other feasible strategy for F would induce all …rms to locate in L.
incentive to set a positive standard level. Moreover, the cheapest way to attract all …rms is to set exactly the same level of standard as L. In this way F does not need to compensate any of the …rms for a higher standard mismatch. The optimal sharing I and sharing II taxes for case (c) are both boundary solutions. Government F sets the highest tax that still attracts some …rms to its country (the …rms in the intervals [0; l F ] and [l F ; 1], respectively).
For small k undercutting dominates sharing (Part (a) ). All …rms can be attracted without having to set the tax much below L's tax. For L = 0 there is no strategy for F that yields a positive rent, meaning that F is indi¤erent among all feasible strategies. Thus, (by assumption) F sets a zero standard and sets F = 0.
To see why in Part
undercuts otherwise, suppose that, for some standard and tax levels, L and F are sharing …rms.. When raising its own tax, F has to consider a 'tax level e¤ect'-F will earn more rent per …rm -and a 'tax base e¤ect'-fewer …rms will locate in F . Since for k 1 …rms' location decisions are relatively elastic with respect to taxes (recall thatŝ
the tax base e¤ect dominates the tax level e¤ect and F increases its tax less than L does
. Thus the share of …rms locating in F increases. The more L raises its tax, the more …rms it will lose to F . Eventually, all …rms with s l L locate in F . At this point, an undercutting strategy because yields higher rents for F because it has to lower F only marginally to increase its share by (1 l L ).
Similarly, there exists a sharing tax limit in part (c). Notice that the proposition only states that F shares …rms up to that tax level, but not whether it does so by setting a lower or higher standard than L. It is possible (as shown in the proof) to identify two subsets of
is in the …rst or second of the subsets, respectively. Intuitively, if L sets a relatively low standard level then sharing with a higher standard level tends to yield higher rents for F ; if L sets a relatively high standard level then sharing with a lower standard level yields higher rents for F . In particular, if l L 1 2 then setting a higher standard and sharing is never a best response for F . Instead of setting a standard that exceeds L's standard by x, i.e. l F = l L + x, and some tax F , Government F can set l F = l L x without changing the tax. Doing so increases F 's rent per …rm without reducing its share of …rms.
A.3.2 The developed country' s best response
Government L takes Government F 's subgame perfect strategy f (l L ; L ) as given and maximizes its rent function over S L . Just like Government F 's rent function, L's rent function evaluated at f is not continuous. For example, discontinuities arise at the sharing tax limit L (l L ). But given f , we can safely exclude from the set of candidates for best response all strategies with L >^ L (l L ) (except (l L ; L ) = (0; 0)), because such strategies induce F to undercut and hence leave L with zero rents while a tax that induces F to share …rms yields positive rents. Thus, we can formulate the following problem for L.
Proposition 2 summarizes L's best response to f . We usel L to denote the critical standard level so that the sharing tax limit is at least as large as the cost to cover the standard if and only if l L l L . See Figure 6 for an illustration. ), Government L's best response to f is to set no standard and set zero tax. Speci…cally, (l L ; L ) = (0; 0).
b. If the marginal cost of standard mismatch is at an intermediate level (
Government L's best response to f is to set a standard strictly larger thanl L and set its tax at the sharing tax limit,^ L (l L ), the highest tax that induces F to share …rms.
This tax is higher than the tax set by F . As k is increased, standard provision by L decreases from l L / 1 to l L ' 22 25 , and rents per …rm increase.
c. If the marginal cost of standard mismatch is high (k > 1), Government L's best response to f is to set a standard of l L = 8 9 and to set L =^ 1 L (l L ), the highest tax that induces F to share …rms and which exceeds costs by at least a factor of 2.
Speci…cally, (l L ; L ) = k .
If k 1 3 , Government F chooses an undercutting strategy for each tax that exceeds the cost of the standard (Proposition 1). Thus each of L's strategies yields zero rents and, by A3, Government L picks (l L ; L ) = (0; 0). Rents for both governments are zero.
The lower the standard level that L sets, the larger its share of …rms and the greater the incentive for F to switch to an undercutting strategy because the switch induces all …rms located in L to move to F . Therefore, so that it does not induce F to undercut, L puts itself into a situation in which it attracts only a relatively small share of …rms by setting a high standard level. Because L's rents are
When k > 1, it is better for L to let F be the country that sets a low standard and earn high sharing rents, because that means that F accommodates higher taxes by L without
and sets a tax L =^ L 1 9
instead of its actual equilibrium choice l L = 8 9 and L =^ L . Government F 's best response would be to set l F = 1 3 instead of l F = . As with the actual equilibrium strategies, L attracts one third of the …rms. But the tax L is able to set,^ L 1 9
, is so much lower than
that rents per …rm are only compared to 4 9 k + 4 9 with the equilibrium strategy.
35 Proposition 2 is restated below with the exact expressions for the optimal strategies.
In order to obtain the ability to set a higher tax without losing …rms, L accepts that it has to set a costlier standard level.
Propositions 1 and 2 can be used to solve for the mutual best responses of the strategies of F and L, thus yielding the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies presented in Theorem 1.
A.3.3 Proofs
The proof of Proposition 1 uses a sequence of auxiliary results, which are stated and proven separately in the following Lemmas.
Lemma 1.
with l F > 0 is never a best response. 
Undercutting with l F 6 = l L is never a best response.
Proof.
1. We will …rst show that undercutting I is non-empty if
(l L ; L ) = (0; 0) undercutting is not feasible, because it requires to set a tax strictly below zero, which is not feasible. Next, we show that (l
Take any undercutting strategy with l F > 0 and a corresponding undercutting tax F = L k jl L l F j ". Using the same " to undercut, the strategy
and yields more rents per …rm because it saves costs of l F per …rm and reduces revenue per …rm by at most kl 0 F . Thus, undercutting with l F > 0 is never a best response.
To see that the reverse implication holds, suppose that L = l L . In this case F cannot …nd a strategy so that the …rm s = l L prefers the tax and the standard level o¤ered in F to the ones o¤ered in L because if l F 6 = l L , F will have to compensate s = l L for more than its standard mismatch meaning that F 's tax would have to undercut L's tax by more than jl L l F j which is not feasible. (l F ; F ) . Moreover, the fact that every …rm preferred (l F ; F ) to (l L ; L ) implies that every …rm also prefers (l
and all other …rms are indi¤erent).
Suppose that
Next, we show that if undercutting is feasible then (l
Take any undercutting strategy with l F 6 = l L and a corresponding undercutting tax F = L k jl L l F j ". Using the same " to undercut,
which is true as well, showing that for any undercutting strategy l F 6 = l L there exists another undercutting strategy yielding more rents.
In the following, we will deal with the case (l L ; L ) 6 = (0; 0). If (l L ; L ) = (0; 0) ; by Lemma 1, undercutting is not feasible, and any feasible strategy for F yields zero rents. By assumption, F chooses (l F ; F ) = (0; 0). Lemma 2a.
, a sharing strategy is optimal among strategies in sharing I and sharing II only if l F = 0.
Take any sharing strategy
This strategy is feasible, attracts the same fraction of …rms, and F makes strictly higher rents per …rm. Next, take any sharing strategy
is feasible for small enough " and yields strictly higher rents for jurisdiction F . This strategy yields the same rent per …rm, so it su¢ ces to show that the same …rms
Lemma 2b.
1. If k < 1, the unique rent maximizing sharing strategy for F is
1. From Lemmas 1 and 2a we know that l F = 0 at any best response of F . We will derive the optimal sharing tax and show that there always exists an " such that undercutting yields more rents. Given ( L ; l L ), government F faces the following optimization problem for sharing,
We will ignore the constraints for the moment. The revenue function is strictly concave in F , so our solution will be unique and we only need to consider …rst-order conditions
which is strictly larger than zero. But
one of the constraints binds. Strategies with
we do not consider such strategies here).
2. The proof is analogous to the proof or Part 1, except that we do not get uniqueness. , the rent maximizing undercutting strategy yields higher rents than the rent maximizing sharing strategy for all
Proof. For k 1 3 , we have L > 3kl L for all strategies with L > l L . so by Lemma 2b the optimal sharing strategy is (l s F :
all …rms s l L locate in L) Comparing this to the rents from undercutting shows that, for
for " su¢ ciently small. If l L = 1, the optimal sharing strategy is in fact an undercutting strategy (it attracts all …rms but a set of …rms of measure zero). 
For l L < 1, sharing yields more rents than undercutting if and only if
We now set " = 0 and solve for the tax at which both sides are equal. This tax will be the highest tax that L can set so that F does not undercut. No matter how small F sets ", the right hand side will be smaller then the left hand side at this tax. On the other hand, for a tax that is larger than the tax at which both sides are equal, F can …nd an " su¢ ciently small that undercutting yields higher rents than sharing. We solve
36 Notice that at l L = 0, this always holds so that undercutting is always better.
The left hand side expression is a quadratic function of L . Solving the equation yields two solutions, which we denote by~
Notice that the factor in front of 2 L is positive. Sharing revenues are therefore larger than
2 (we omit the derivation). Therefore the critical tax beyond which F will undercut is given bŷ
See also Figure 5 in Section 4.
. The strategy that maximizes r
over sharing II is given by l
.
Proof. We start with deriving the optimal sharing strategy over sharing I. Government
Without doing the calculus, we will reduce the optimization problem by …rst showing that a necessary condition for (l F ; F ) being a solution to the problem is that
i.e., given some l F , Government F will set the highest tax that possibly attracts some …rms to its jurisdiction. Take any strategy (l F ; F ) with F < L + k (l L l F ) (notice that these are the strategies that are not at the upper bound of the sharing I set, see also Figure 2 
Therefore, we can reduce F 's problem to
The objective function is strictly concave in l F , so second order conditions will be satis…ed, and the maximizer is unique. Ignoring the constraint for the moment and solving for an interior solution yields
For higher L , sharing with less standard is not the optimal strategy. At the boundary solution l s1 F = l L undercutting yields more than sharing. The corresponding tax F sets would be F = L = l L (k + 2). By assumption, it would attract half of the …rms and
for su¢ ciently small ". Therefore undercutting is better than the optimal sharing I strategy
The strategy that maximizes r F over sharing II can be derived analogously. We omit this derivation here, but note that
So again, we get a bound for L so that the optimal undercutting strategy yields higher rents than the strategy that maximizes r F over sharing II if L is larger than this bound.
(recall from the proof of Lemma 5 that this was the upper bound for L , so that the constraint l F 1 l L was not binding). We will derive^ 1 L (l L ; k) and then verify that it is indeed not larger than this bound, so that undercutting is better than the optimal sharing I strategy for all L >^ 1 L (l L ; k). For given (l L ; L ) rents from the optimal sharing 1 strategy are given by
in the proof of Lemma 4, so we provide less detail. Let " = 0, and set the di¤erence of this rent and undercutting rents equal to zero. We can solve for the highest tax of government L depending on l L such that F prefers sharing to undercutting 37 :
Government F prefers the strategy with l s1 F and the highest sharing tax to the optimal undercutting strategy, and prefers undercutting otherwise. 37 As in the proof of Lemma 4, we obtain two solutions but the second one will be larger than 38 (The developed country's best response to f ). k .
Proof:
Part a:
Part b: From Proposition 1, we know that, for each level l L , Government F is going to locate at l F = 0 and undercut if L >^ L (l L ). Such strategies can therefore not be optimal for government L, because it can assure itself of positive rents by setting l L = 1 and L 2 (1; 3k) (by Lemma 4, F would choose a sharing strategy in this case). We can also exclude strategies with l L = 0 as F is going to undercut then for every positive tax. The 38 Proposition 2 and Theorem 1 are restated here with the exact expressions for the optimal strategies. reduced optimization problem for L is therefore
The objective function is continuous and the feasible set is compact. Hence, there exists a solution to the problem. As previously, we will …rst ignore the constraints, which yields (ii) l L 2 (0; 1)
The maximization problem is
The solution to which is l L = 1 (k + 1) 2 6k + k 2 + 2k p 7k 2 6k + 3 3 4k p 7k 2 6k + 3 > 0:
Case 2) Consider a strategy with l L = 1. Maximizing rents with respect tax yields
, which is indeed less than^ L (1) = 3k. We denote the corresponding rents by , and undercuts otherwise.
We will then show that the optimal strategy under supposition 1 yields more rents than the one under supposition 2, and verify that, under this optimal strategy, government F indeed sets less standard and sets the highest sharing tax.
To see that, if l L 1 2
, setting more standard and setting the highest sharing tax can never be the best response for government F , observe that any strategy (l F ; F ) with l F > l L and Under this supposition, government L's problem is
Solving for an interior solution yields L = 1+ 
Solving this for l L yields two solutions, l (k + 1). We also need to verify whether a strategy with l L > 4 p 3 6 and no binding tax constraint yields more revenue. The partial derivative with respect to l L is always positive, and therefore government L wants to set l L as high as possible. We only need to check l L = 4 p 3 6. It can be veri…ed that this strategy does not yield higher rents. The derivation is omitted.
2. Next, suppose that r Under this supposition, government L's problem is
Solving for an interior solution yields L = 
s.t. l L 2 7 4 p 3; 1 2
Solving this for an interior solution yields two solutions, l . Only the second is a maximizer. Indeed, we have that l (k 1). One can also verify that a strategy with l L < 7 4 p 3 and no binding tax constraint does not yield more revenue. Again, the derivation is omitted.
It is immediate to see that L prefers the strategy with high standard-provision to the one with low standard provision. It only remains to verify that at this strategy choice of L, Government F indeed wants to set less standard level and set the highest …rm sharing tax.
Since the tax L sets is, by derivation, the highest one at which F prefers sharing and less provision to undercutting, we only need to verify that F does not want to set more standard and share. But we showed already that this cannot be the case since l L 1 2
. The optimal strategy for L is therefore (l L ; L ) = in part b.
